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SOUND GOVERNANCE AND SOUND LAW 
Colin S. Diver* 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BU-
REAUCRACY. By Christopher F. Edley, Jr. New Haven: Yale Univer-
sity Press. 1990. Pp. xiii, 270. $30. 
I have often thought of "scope of review" as the black hole of ad-
ministrative law - a source of endless fascination and utterly no illu-
mination, a collapsed doctrinal star that swallows up every idea in its 
vicinity, whose presence can be discerned only by the way it distorts 
the behavior of those who stumble into its gravitational field. In re-
flecting upon my own encounters with the subject, I am reminded of 
Oliver Wendell Holmes' description of his days as a law student at 
Harvard: "One found oneself plunged in a thick fog of details - in a 
black and frozen night, in which were no flowers, no spring, no easy 
joys."1 
Anyone who dares to plunge into this bleak and humorless world 
deserves credit, if only for courage. In his recent book, Administrative 
Law: Rethinking Judicial Control of Bureaucracy, Christopher F. 
Edley, Jr.,2 does just that. And it is indeed a courageous and ambi-
tious effort. Drawing upon extensive experience as a student of law 
and public policy, federal bureaucrat, political strategist, and law pro-
fessor, Edley has written a book of broad sweep that probes the under-
lying causes of administrative law's doctrinal malaise and offers a 
provocative remedy. 
As diagnosis, the book succeeds admirably. Edley locates the prin-
cipal source of doctrinal confusion in the ambivalences and ambigui-
ties that characterize our attitudes about the separation of powers. As 
prescription, the book is far less persuasive. Edley urges reviewing 
courts to cast off the shackles of comparative institutional competence 
and become full partners in the development of effective public policies 
through the mechanism of "sound governance review." Like many 
bold manifestos, Edley's is long on exhortation and very short on spec-
ification. His utopia is imagined, not designed. Utopian reformers 
• Dean and Bernard G. Segal Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
B.A. 1965, Amherst College; LL.B. 1968, Harvard. - Ed. 
1. o.w. HOLMES, Brown University- Commencement 1897, in CoLLECfED LEGAL PAPERS 
164 (1920). I don't mean to pick on Harvard. It happens that Christopher Edley and I also 
studied there and that Edley is now a member of its faculty. 
2. Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Edley has also worked as a White House and 
presidential campaign aide. 
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will applaud. Curmudgeonly institutionalists will shake their heads. I 
guess I'm a curmudgeon. 
I 
E<lley devotes the first half of his book to describing and criticizing 
the "structure" of contemporary administrative law. In a very brief 
introductory section, he traces the familiar story of the triumph of 
New Deal pragmatism over nineteenth-century "separation of powers 
formalism" (p. 5). Following the New Deal, the project of administra-
tive law shifted from maintaining structural integrity in a system of 
separated powers to controlling the exercise of discretion broadly dele-
gated to multifunctional administrative agencies. In the process, ac-
cording to E<lley, concern with separation of powers did not 
disappear; it merely went underground, as it were, to form the hidden 
substructure of contemporary administrative law doctrine. After 
years of patient jurisprudential archaeology, E<lley has unearthed that 
structure for all to see. 
The structure consists of a "trichotomy of paradigmatic decision 
making methods" that forms "the underlying framework both for cali-
brating the degree of judicial deference to be accorded agency action 
and for normative prescriptions about administrative procedure" (p. 
13). E<lley labels his three models "adjudicatory fairness, politics, and 
scientific expertise" (p. 3; emphasis omitted). The connection between 
this taxonomy and traditional separation of powers thinking is obvi-
ous. The three paradigms idealize the decisionmaking styles conven-
tionally associated with the three branches of government, and in that 
sense the trichotomy carries forward into the modem era the struc-
tural concerns of nineteenth-century administrative law. 
E<iley devotes most of Chapter Two and parts of Chapters Three 
and Four to a demonstration of the pervasive influence of the trichot-
omy on judicial review of administrative action. Courts use the tri-
chotomy, he claims, as a framework for categorizing particular 
administrative decisions or actions and then selecting the degree of 
deference appropriate to the decisionmaking model chosen. Thus, for 
example, E<iley claims that the conventional law-fact-policy distinc-
tion in scope of review doctrine "flows neatly from the trichotomy" (p. 
29). Courts tend to review "questions of law" most independently be-
cause they associate law finding with the adjudicatory fairness model 
that they themselves practice. They accord more deference to findings 
of "fact" and still more to determinations of "policy,'' which they view 
as products of successively less judicially accessible processes of scien-
tific and political decisionmaking (p. 29). Similarly, E<iley attributes a 
cluster of doctrines3 based on the familiar rulemaking-adjudication 
3. For example, the principle that a hearing is not constitutionally required in rulemaking 
proceedings, Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915); Londoner v. 
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distinction to trichotomous thinking (pp. 36-48, 175-80). 
Edley devotes the balance of the book's first half to demonstrating 
the fundamental incoherence of a system of judicial review grounded 
on the trichotomy's three paradigms. He distinguishes between the 
system's "descriptive" and "conceptual" failings. The descriptive fail-
ings relate to the inevitably messy fit between ideal types and reality. 
As a consequence, courts often assign a particular agency action to the 
wrong category or incorrectly assume that the agency has satisfied the 
strictures of the ideal type. A common example is the reflexive judi-
cial attribution of administrative "expertise" to decisions that were in 
fact informed primarily by political bargaining or just bad science (pp. 
54-57). 
The trichotomy's conceptual problems are of two types. First, the 
categories are intertwined to such an extent that it becomes almost 
impossible to police the boundaries among them (pp. 74-83). Each 
paradigmatic method of decisionmaking depends in some measure on 
methods characteristic of the others. Thus, to use Edley's example, 
good politics requires a foundation of reliable empirical information 
about the problem and alternative solutions (good science), which in 
tum requires some attention to concerns about the consistency with 
which competing interests are being treated (fairness), and so on (pp. 
80-83). 
The second conceptual failing of the trichotomy is the "attributive 
duality" of its three models (p. 83). By "attributive duality," Edley 
means that each model is associated with both positive and negative 
normative attributes. Thus, adjudicatory fairness is associated with 
the virtues of consistency, neutrality, and reasoned elaboration, as well 
as the vices of political unaccountability, proceduralism, and conserva-
tism. Science has the positive attributes of objectivity, verifiability, 
and rationality, but also the negative attributes of alienation, imper-
sonality, and inaccessibility. The political method implies both popu-
lar accountability and majoritarian tyranny, responsiveness and 
willfulness (p. 21 fig. 1). Given this duality, no absolute guide deter-
mines for courts when an agency should utilize a particular model. 
Although courts occasionally attempt to balance the costs and benefits 
of a particular methodology, as in the choice of rulemaking or adjudi-
cation, 4 usually they arbitrarily select either the positive attributes of 
Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908); the highly deferential standard for reviewing an agency's decision 
to make policy by adjudication rather than rulemaking, NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 
267 (1974); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947); the greater judicial tolerance for ex parte 
communications in rulemaking proceedings, Sierra Club v. Castle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 
1981); and the "unalterably closed mind" standard for disqualifying a rulemaker for prejudg-
ment or bias, Association of Natl. Advertisers, Inc. v. FfC, 627 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980). 
4. See, e.g., National Petroleum Refiners Assn. v. FfC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. 
denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969); Robinson, The 
Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Adminis-
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the model favored or the negative attributes of the model disapproved. 
As a consequence of these descriptive and conceptual failings, the 
trichotomy has not produced a coherent road map to guide courts in 
their search for constraints on the exercise of administrative power. 
Instead, it operates more in the manner of a menu, from which courts 
arbitrarily, selectively, and often inaccurately choose arguments to 
support conclusions based upon some other unstated considerations. 
To conclude his demonstration of the incoherent structure of contem-
porary administrative law, Edley leads us through that notorious juris-
prudential swamp known as "scope of judicial review," concluding, as 
have so many others, 5 that a century of judicial and congressional 
wordsmithing has left a legacy of only confusion. 
The second half of the book is devoted to considering various pos-
sible remedies for this state of incoherence. In Chapter Five, Edley 
surveys several remedial strategies, including statutory interpretation-
based approaches exemplified by the work of Louis Jaffe,6 the interest 
representation model sketched most fully by Richard Stewart, 7 bu-
reaucratic rationality theories of the sort explicated in the work of 
Jerry Mashaw, 8 and the reductionist approach of Kenneth Culp Da-
vis.9 Not surprisingly, Edley finds all of these alternative strategies 
unsuccessful. The first three theories essentially restate the three parts 
of the trichotomy, but each fails according to Edley because it pro-
vides no escape from the model's descriptive and conceptual failings. 
Davis' pervasive "reasonableness" standard avoids the incompleteness 
of the other theories, but does so by merely resurrecting the trichot-
omy under the name of comparative institutional competence. 
In the final two chapters, Edley finally unveils his own proposed 
remedy for the trichotomy-infected incoherence of administrative law. 
He begins by offering a "modest agenda" (p. 169) of incremental steps, 
subsumed under the heading "harder look" review. Edley acknowl-
edges the apparent contradiction of trying to shore up a conceptual 
structure that he has spent 170 pages dismantling (p. 170). But he 
recognizes that most courts and commentators will find it impossible 
to toss away the conceptual crutches they have leaned on for so long. 
trative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1970); Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or 
Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REv. 921 (1965). 
5. See, e.g., 5 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE§ 29 (2d ed. 1984); Gellhom & 
Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 15 CoLUM. L. REv. 771, 780-81 (1975). 
6. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CoNTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (1965); Jaffe, The Illu-
sion of the Ideal Administration, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1183 (1973). 
7. See Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1667 
(1975). 
8. J. MAsHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JurncE (1983); Mashaw, The Management Side of Due 
Process: Some Theoretical and Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness and Time-
liness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 CoRNELL L. REv. 772 (1974). 
9. K. DAVIS, supra note 5, § 29:14 at 392-93. 
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It is to this audience that the incremental reforms of "harder look" 
review are addressed. 
To the extent that courts persist in using trichotomous templates 
as the measure of administrative action, Edley's plea is that they use 
them with greater discrimination and in combination. Courts should 
look searchingly behind the facade of "fairness," "expertise," and 
"political choice" to see whether and to what extent the agency has in 
fact properly and sensitively utilized the methodologies associated 
with those virtues. The most interesting application of this otherwise 
unremarkable suggestion is Edley's discussion of how courts should 
treat agencies' political choices. Reviewing courts rarely acknowledge 
the operation of political considerations in agency decisionmaking, 
and when they do, they often exhibit a particularly simplistic or ro-
manticized view of administrative politics.10 
Edley calls on the courts to confront the operation of politics in 
administration head on, in three ways. First, courts should demand 
that agencies disclose the political considerations - both the ideologi-
cal or partisan preferences and the interest-group accommodations -
that played a role in the decisionmaking process. Second, courts 
should "regulate the mix of political and nonpolitical decision making 
paradigms" (p. 196) by defining the circumstances under which and 
the extent to which politics may properly play a role. Third, courts 
should police the "quality" of the agency's forays into the political 
world by requiring the agency to demonstrate, for example, that it 
consulted with all significant interests, or that its decision embodies a 
clearly expressed electoral mandate or congressional preference (pp. 
196-99). 
The heart of Edley's argument is the final chapter, in which he 
abandons the crabbed posture of critic and tinkerer, and assumes the 
visionary stance foreshadowed for over 200 pages. In this "specula-
tive" essay, Edley calls upon the judiciary to ''move away from its 
anachronistic focus on discretion and face directly the problems of 
sound governance" (p. 213). In Edley's bravura new world, a 
"reinvented" judiciary would become a full partner11 in the poli-
10. Compare the opinions of Justices White (for the Court) and Rehnquist (partially dissent-
ing) in Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 32-57, 57-59 
(1983). In striking down a decision of the Transportation Department to rescind a motor vehicle 
safety standard mandating the installation of passive restraints, Justice White appeared to judge 
the rescission solely as an exercise in technical expertise, and made no mention of its political 
dimension. Justice Rehnquist, by contrast, expressly noted the part played by the election of 
Ronald Reagan and the resulting alteration in the weights assigned by the new administration to 
the costs and benefits of a passive restraint standard. 
11. Pp. 136, 213-14. Edley struggles to find the precise metaphor to capture his thought. He 
seems most fond of the "partnership" image invoked by Judge Leventhal in Greater Boston 
Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851-52 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 
(1971), and repeated frequently by subsequent courts and commentators. See, e.g., Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Gardner, Federal 
Courts and Agencies: An Audit of the Partnership Books, 15 CoLUM. L. REv. 800 (1975); Sha-
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cymaking process of government, sharing with the administrative and 
legislative branches the responsibility to make government more effec-
tive at coping with the massively complex problems it daily confronts. 
The goal of controlling bureaucratic discretion bequeathed to adminis-
trative law by the New Deal is no longer up to the task, if it ever was, 
according to Edley. The antidiscretion project, with its stilted concep-
tions of institutional roles, is at best an indirect method and at worst a 
perverse method of promoting sound governance. Separation of pow-
ers thinking must embrace a multifunctional conception of administra-
tion and a comparably encompassing conception of the judicial role in 
reviewing its handiwork. In the balance of the concluding chapter, 
Edley offers some suggestions on how a reviewing court would go 
about elaborating norms of sound governance and how the judiciary 
could be better equipped, by training and expert assistance, for the 
demands of such a challenging assignment. 
II 
The success of Edley's undertaking depends on the answers to 
three questions: has he accurately characterized the underlying struc-
ture of administrative law, has he convincingly demonstrated its inco-
herence, and has he constructed an attractive alternative? I would 
answer: mostly yes, mostly no, and mostly no. 
In his search for the deep structure of the law of judicial review, 
Edley quite conventionally looks to the language of judicial opinions 
in cases reviewing agency doings. 12 Unfortunately, courts tend to be 
remarkably inarticulate about the considerations that inform their 
choice of reviewing posture. To the extent that they do attempt to 
articulate those considerations, they invoke a wide variety of analo-
gies, metaphors, and rUI.es of thumb to fill the commodious interstices 
of positive law.13 The relationship between these judicial dicta and 
piro, Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487, 1507 (1983). Yet he ac-
knowledges that, unlike partners, courts and agencies stand in a necessarily hierarchical 
relationship, comparable to that of a corporation's chief executive officer-vice president. Pp. 214-
15. 
12. Edley considers the possibility that the structure of administrative law might be located 
only in "a higher rationality" not expressed in judicial opinions. P. 129. But he dismisses the 
possibility on the grounds that there is no evidence of the increasing doctrinal clarity and articu-
lation that one would expect a hidden rationality to produce. 
13. For example, whether the contested action lies within the scope of "administrative rou-
tine," Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 411 (1941), or the agency's "everyday experience," NLRB v. 
Hearst Pub., Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944); whether there is an especially pressing need for 
litigation to terminate immediately, O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504, 508 
(1951); whether Congress has "directly spoken to the precise question," Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984); whether Congress has cre-
ated a presumption in favor of or against regulation, Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm 
Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983); whether the agency's determination is "judgmental or 
predictive," FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 813-14 (1978); or 
whether the contested agency action involves the choice of remedy or sanction to impose for an 
established violation, Butz v. Glover Livestock Commn. Co., 411 U.S. 182 (1973). 
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Edley's trichotomy is not obvious to the naked eye. Courts rarely re-
fer to a three-part taxonomy of legitimating concepts. Instead, their 
constructs are often dichotomous - such as the common distinctions 
between rulemaking and adjudication, findings of fact and conclusions 
of law, or independent review and deferential review. More com-
monly, courts simply invoke unitary concepts - such as "expertise" 
or "policy" - without specifying the typology of which they are a 
member. Statutory law also does not support Eclley's construct, be-
cause Congress speaks in almost as many voices as the courts when it 
comes to scope of judicial review. 14 
To the extent that this linguistic rubble rests on any single concep-
tual foundation, however, I think Edley has got it right. Despite the 
general level of judicial inarticulateness, crude images of idealized ju-
dicial, scientific, and political decisionmaking processes lurk at or 
closely beneath the surface of most judicial opinions. Behind the judi-
cial deference to OSHA's "expertise," for example, one can faintly dis-
cern an image of the scientist in her laboratory or the policy analyst at 
his computer. Similarly, aggressive judicial review of NLRB orders 
often seems to be based on an image of the agency as a common law 
court. Thus, while judicial and legislative rhetoric does not neatly 
map onto Eclley's framework, one must conclude, with him, that a 
separation of powers ethos does indeed permeate judicial thinking. 
One must also agree with Eclley that the separation of powers, 
whatever its attractions as a rhetorical device, has not, in application, 
produced a very satisfactory jurisprudence of judicial review. Judges 
all too often make simplistic, selective, and conclusory use of the tri-
chotomy. Among the numerous illustrations sprinkled throughout the 
book, perhaps the most telling are those in which two judges look at 
the same agency action and see two different things. Thus, in Motor 
Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Fann Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co., 15 Justice White looked at the rescission of the airbag 
rule and saw bad science; Justice Rehnquist saw good politics (and 
acceptable science). In Association of National Advertisers, Inc. v. 
FTC 16 Judge Tamm saw the Ff C's proceedings on children's adver-
tising as a political process appropriate for an "unalterably closed 
mind" test for prejudgment,17 while Judge MacKinnon saw sufficient 
trappings of the judicial process to call for application of a more adju-
dicatory "substantial bias" standard. ls 
Despite the relentlessness of his attack on the trichotomy, how-
14. See, for example, the variety of review standards contained in the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988). 
15. 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
16. 627 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 921 (1980). 
17. Association of Natl Advertisers, 627 F.2d at 1154, 1170-74 .. 
18. Association of Natl Advertisers, 627 F.2d at 1181-82, 1197. 
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ever, Edley cannot quite bring himself to consign it to the scrap heap. 
In his introduction, he characterizes the trichotomy as "unworkable as 
a foundation for doctrine" (p. 4) and as a cause for the "intractability" 
of doctrinal problems (p. 8), seeming to foreshadow its outright rejec-
tion. But in the body of the work his language is somewhat more 
temperate, 19 suggesting that the trichotomy may be salvageable after 
all. Indeed, Edley devotes an entire chapter to suggesting ways to 
make trichotomy-inspired review more serviceable, and in his final, 
most utopian chapter, the once-condemned trichotomy is miracu-
lously rehabilitated as a "trio" - that is, as a principle of "sound 
governance" that "require[s] a combination of all three decision mak-
ing paradigms included in the trichotomy" (p. 222). 
This ambivalence leaves the reader wondering exactly how Edley 
would overcome the conceptual failings so patiently adumbrated in the 
earlier chapters. His apparent answer is to "[b]lend and [b]alance" the 
three models into an "integrated trio."20 At first blush, the attraction 
of this strategy is undeniable. We all know that real life administrative 
decisionmaking is complex and multidimensional. Bureaucrats do (or 
should) try to follow the commands of applicable constitutional and 
statutory provisions and judicial precedents, treat like cases alike, 
worry about precedential effects, consider reasonable alternative 
courses of action, utilize appropriate analytical and evaluative meth-
odologies, search for reliable data, accommodate significant organized 
and unorganized interest groups, and vindicate deeply held personal, 
partisan, or organizational conceptions of good public policy. The 
product of such a decisionmaking process cannot sensibly be forced 
into the Procrustean bed of a single paradigm. To the extent that 
courts in fact behave this way,21 the "blending" strategy seems an un-
deniable improvement. 
But on closer inspection, Edley's "blending" strategy is really no 
answer at all to the trichotomy's asserted conceptual failings. One 
cannot logically construct a coherent structure from three incoherent 
components. If the three paradigms' cognitive styles are so inter-
19. For example, he characterizes the conceptual failings as "shortcomings" that produce 
"confusion,'' "arbitrary" choices, and "unstable" conclusions. P. 73. 
20. Pp. 222-23. See also his discussion of "paradigm mix" at pp. 192-96, 202-03. 
21. Edley claims that such inappropriate "pigeonhol[ing]" is the "practical effect of most 
doctrinal reasoning." P. 223. I disagree. While it is true that courts selectively and simplisti-
cally invoke concepts like "expertise" and "policy" to justify their conclusions, I do not think 
that they are insensitive to the complexity of the decisionmaking processes they examine. Simply 
because, for example, Justice White focused on the analytical aspects of the passive restraint 
rescission in State Farm hardly means that he was unaware of or even unsympathetic with its 
political motivation. A plausible reading of his view is that the agency may, or should, take 
political considerations into account, so long as it establishes an evidentiary and analytical basis 
for concluding that its action is not inconsistent with the statute. Similarly, Judge Tamm's char-
acterization of the FTC's action contested in Association of National Advertisers as "rulemaking" 
hardly implies that he was unaware of the mix of cognitive styles that inevitably enters into a 
proceeding to regulate children's advertising. 
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twined that they literally "collapse rather than merely mingle" (p. 
135), "integrating" them is meaningless. They are, by Edley's own 
assertion, already essentially "integrated" into a formless mass. Simi-
larly, if the models each suffer from attributive duality, taking them in 
combination will not magically produce attributive singularity. Inte-
grating the models into a composite procedure would seem as likely to 
magnify the attributive duality, by posting even more pluses and mi-
nuses on the moral tally sheet, as to dampen attributive duality, by 
cancelling out the pluses or the minuses. 
Edley offers two answers to the apparent logical impossibility of 
his blending strategy. The first is a rather off-hand and half-hearted 
suggestion near the end of Chapter 6 that courts should generalize the 
cost-benefit calculus announced by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. 
Eldridge. 22 Without addressing some of the formidable theoretical 
and practical difficulties with the Eldridge formula,23 this prescription 
inspires little confidence as a way out of the conceptual thicket. One 
would have expected Edley to expend considerably greater energy on a 
problem apparently so crucial to his thesis. 
The second, and by far the more important, answer is "sound gov-
ernance" review. Edley is confident that courts, liberated from confin-
ing self-imposed notions of institutional competence, can fashion over 
time a common law of sound governance. As they do, principles for 
defining the proper mix and blend of decisionmaking models will 
emerge. Ifhe is right, he is a prophet. If he is wrong, he is a dreamer. 
Which is it? 
Unfortunately, Edley's "speculative essay" sketches only the dim-
mest outline of what "norms of sound governance" would actually 
look like or where they would come from. Most of the chapter is de-
voted to telling us what sound governance norms would not look like 
- namely, the trichotomy - and why we should trust courts to be 
able to handle the job. Precious little space is devoted to telling us 
what sound governance is. The most revealing passage appears in his 
discussion of how a court might approach the task of reviewing a hy-
pothetical OSHA workplace health standard: 
I would not object to a court requiring the agency to evaluate regulatory 
alternatives using cost-benefit analysis or the Ames test for bacterial 
mutagenicity or to do so in terms of impact on each of several classes of 
affected individuals or firms. These matters seem substantive and cer-
tainly inappropriate for courts steeped in separation of powers ethos. 
But if a judge is persuaded that action without such analysis might well 
be unsound, the court should require it: When an accessible norm of 
22. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See pp. 210-12. 
23. See, e.g., Mashaw, Administrative Due Process as Social·Cost Accounting. 9 HOFSTRA L. 
R.Ev. 1423 (1981); Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus/or Administrative Adju-
dication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 28 (1976). 
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sound decision making exists, or when the court can attempt to formu-
late one without prejudice to the power of agency or legislature to cor-
rect a judicial misconception, a conscientious judge should act on 
personal conviction. [p. 231; footnote omitted] 
Taken at face value, this is an extraordinary statement. E<lley 
would have reviewing judges substitute their judgment for that of ad-
ministrators, on the basis of personal conviction about "what should be 
required in order to make sound public policy" (p. 231 ). Can he mean 
this? If reviewing judges should impose upon an agency their personal 
views about decisionmaking methodologies, should they not also im-
pose their convictions regarding the alternatives to be considered, the 
interests to be consulted, the factors to be weighed, and the values and 
weights to be assigned? Will the pages of the Federal Reporter be filled 
with the ideological, partisan, even religious ruminations of judges, 
Republicans and Democrats, pro-lifers and pro-choicers, feminists and 
masculinists, ecologists and economists, science buffs and management 
buffs, alike? Will the chambers of the U.S. Courts of Appeals come to 
resemble the seminar rooms of the Kennedy School of Government? 
This is surely a caricature, but how much of one? To his credit, 
Edley does not shrink from the eyebrow-raising implications of his 
proposal. He recognizes that he will be accused of unleashing judicial 
"willfulness" (p. 231) on the land. His response is not denial, but jus-
tifi.cation. His first line of defense is that open willfulness is preferable 
to the hidden form of willfulness that characterizes much judicial deci-
sionmaking today (p. 231). Bringing judges' unspoken policy convic-
tions to the surface, Edley argues, will promote a constructive 
dialogue among the branches about the meaning of sound governance 
in particular contexts. It is undoubtedly true that, in administrative 
law as in other fields of law, judges often exercise their personal con-
victions under cover of open-textured doctrine and conclusory labels. 
The orthodox remedy, however, is to tighten rather than loosen the 
doctrinal constraints. The Supreme Court has been doing exactly 
that, in a series of decisions that severely constrain the discretion of 
judges to second-guess agency decisions regarding such things as the 
choice of policymaking procedure, 24 the exercise of prosecutorial dis-
cretion, 25 and the interpretation of authorizing statutes.26 Edley criti-
cizes this recent trend as abdication of the courts' obligation to 
participate in the search for sound governance (p. 149). But that an-
swer merely restates the underlying puzzle: what is sound governance, 
and what is the proper role of courts in promoting it? 
24. E.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
435 U.S. 519 (1978); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974). 
25. E.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
26. E.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984). 
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Edley's second defense is that the danger of judicial willfulness is 
held in check by the very structure of the judiciary. The political pro-
cess of judicial appointment helps assure that the "pluralism of polit-
ical and social life generally will be reflected in the wills of judges" (p. 
233). This is an enormously contestable proposition that requires 
much greater elaboration than Edley provides. There is much reason 
to doubt its empirical premise. Judges are drawn from a professional 
elite that is not likely to be representative of the larger populace, even 
in the long run. In the middle run - as we have seen in the past 
decade - the ideology of a particular Administration or sequence of 
Administrations can sharply tilt the political orientation of the judici-
ary. Given the judiciary's long tenure of office, the gap between the 
judiciary's and the society's preference structures may widen over time 
and persist for long periods. 
Even if Edley were correct, as an empirical matter, that the judici-
ary faithfully mirrors the "pluralism" of the larger society, why, as a 
normative matter, would that fact justify the exercise of "personal 
conviction" by individual judges? We justify the exercise of "willful-
ness" by individual legislators by reference to their electoral accounta-
bility and the leveling effect of large-number voting.27 Federal judges 
are not exposed to electoral recall, or for that matter any politically 
accountable form of recall short of impeachment. Nor do federal 
judges exercise authority as members of large groups, but rather sit 
only as individual presiding officers or as members of small appellate 
panels. In such a structure judicial "pluralism" will produce not level-
ing, but fragmentation and divergence. The outcomes and stated ra-
tionales of judicial decisions will vary widely, depending on the 
convictions of the judge or panel involved. Although review by the 
Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court could theoretically con-
strain the degree of variation, it would do so only by substituting one 
unrepresentative set of personal judicial convictions for another. Fur-
thermore, we know that the Supreme Court has only very limited 
practical capacity to police deviations among the courts of appeals.28 
Edley's third argument in defense of the judicial willfulness inher-
ent in sound governance review is the capacity for "correction" of ju-
dicial errors by interaction with agencies and Congress (p. 232). He 
foresees a "continuing dialogue among the branches" in an "interac-
tive, dynamic process of governance" produced by the sheer multiplic-
ity of forums (p. 236). In this part of his defense, Edley introduces 
two principles of institutional restraint. The less significant is the fa-
miliar point that courts should avoid deciding cases on constitutional 
27. This, at base, is why the Supreme Court was correct in declaring unconstitutional the 
legislative veto. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
28. See Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme 
Court's Limited Resources/or Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1987). 
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grounds, to permit Congress to overrule their decisions. The more 
significant is an exhortation that courts leave room for the exercise of 
administrative discretion on remand by avoiding excessively specific or 
outcome-determinative decisionmaking methodologies {p. 232). Thus, 
for example, Edley suggests that a court should tell an agency which 
interests must be represented in a regulatory negotiation rather than 
specify the relative weights to be assigned to the various interests par-
ticipating {p. 229). 
There are two defects in this line of argument. First, the terminol-
ogy of "error correction" seems utterly misplaced. If sound govern-
ance is truly a matter of "personal conviction,'' the issue is not one of 
correcting errors, but of wielding power. Whoever has the last word 
wins. Why, in a "post-trichotomy world," should Congress or the 
agency have the last word?29 Second, "dialogue" is not costless. The 
dialogue Edley envisions is a protracted, sequential, multiforum pro-
cess that can make ravenous demands on the resources of its partici-
pants. And the world goes on. While judges, bureaucrats, legislators, 
and hired guns pursue their colloquy, workers breathe unregulated 
carcinogens, overregulated manufacturers lose market share, and un-
protected wilderness disappears. 
The final arrow in Edley's quiver is institutional and personal com-
petence. At one point, he characterizes himself as "unusually san-
guine . . . that federal appellate judges are more capable in more 
senses, both presently and potentially, than critics maintain" {p. 237). 
This is a rather remarkable turnaround for someone who has devoted 
nearly 200 pages to berating the federal judiciary for making an inco-
herent hash of administrative law for fifty years. Indeed, at one point 
in Chapter 4 Edley debunks Justice Frankfurter's profession of faith in 
the competence and self-restraint of the federal judiciary.3o 
"[M]eritocratic appointments,'' sniffs Edley, "probably occur only by 
accident, and article III tenure insulates the mistakes and allows merit 
(somehow defined) to fade."31 With supporters like Edley, who needs 
critics?32 
29. Edley might, although he does not, argue that the process he has in mind is more akin to 
the "deliberative" process envisioned by modem-day civic republicans such as Cass Sunstein. 
See, e.g., Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L. J. 1539 (1988). 
30. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488·89 (1951). 
31. P. 126 (footnote omitted). Edley defends his assertion that meritocratic appointments 
probably occur "only by accident" with these words: "This claim reflects my harsh view engen-
dered by experience as a White House and agency appointee in the Carter administration and as 
an alarmed observer of Reagan administration appointments." P. 126 n.68. 
32. The apparent variability of Edley's views on judicial competence points up the complete 
absence in his book of any articulated theory of administrative or judicial motivation. For a 
recent example of the growing literature on this subject, with citations to earlier examples, see 
Bishop, A Theory of Administrative Law, 19 J. LEGAL Sruo. 489 (1990). Without some positive 
theory of administrative and judicial motivation, one simply cannot decide whether and to what 
extent the actions of administrators require oversight and whether and to what extent judges can 
be trusted to provide that oversight. 
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About the only evidence offered in Chapter Seven to support 
Edley's magically restored faith in judicial capability is a "quick[]" (p. 
239) survey of the performance of federal judges in the course of devis-
ing and enforcing "structural injunctions" in institutional reform cases 
(pp. 252-59). But as he points out, fierce debate persists about whether 
and to what extent institutional reform litigation has been successful 
and how to legitimate the actions that many judges have taken to 
bring about those results. 33 Even if one accepts Edley's view of institu-
tional reform litigation, I question whether it is an apt analogy for the 
job he sets before the federal courts. Most structural decrees are 
designed to remedy pervasive governmental violations of the constitu-
tional rights of a politically vulnerable class. The high order of the 
underlying right and the systemic failure of the political branches to 
protect that right justify a degree of judicial activism thought inappro-
priate in more conventional settings. I would maintain that most cases 
of judicial review of administrative action fall securely within the con-
ventional category. 
III 
I cannot help but wonder if I am beating a straw horse, so to 
speak. Edley does indeed use the strong language and provocative ar-
guments that I have criticized. But lurking very close beneath this 
brave surface is a much more cautious vision of the judicial role. He 
advises courts to be increasingly deferential to agency decisions as they 
approach the "core of the administrator's role" (p. 229), to structure 
their orders to give the agency and even Congress an ample opportu-
nity to "correct a judicial misconception" (p. 231), and to stay their 
hand unless they "see clearly how the agency's decision making can be 
improved" (p. 239). These passages suggest a much more nuanced 
conception of institutional role, a vision of powers separated function-
ally as well as chronologically and geographically. 
As I read these passages, I cannot help but conclude that Edley's 
utopia will end up looking very much like our own imperfect world. 
In the search for "norms of sound governance," where else but to sep-
aration of powers would judges look for principles that stand a chance 
of general acceptance? Edley offers none; his argument is resolutely 
atheoretical. He would have courts steer their vessel by the constella-
tion of "sound governance norms"; yet he offers us no grand theory of 
society or of the state from which to derive their content. In an age of 
aggressively ideological and metatheoretical legal scholarship, Edley is 
33. See, e.g., Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 
(1976); Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change in Public 
Institutions, 65 VA. L. REv. 43 (1979); Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 
1 (1979); Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 1991). 
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a throwback to the apolitical days of his Legal Process mentors. 34 So, 
I confess, am 1.35 To the extent that we really differ, it may be only in 
our relative assessment of the comparative institutional competence of 
courts and agencies. As the material from which to craft a coherent 
structure of administrative law, comparative institutional competence 
may indeed be terribly plastic. But I think - and, in his heart of 
hearts, I think Edley thinks - that it is the only material we have. 
We'll just have to make the best of it. 
34. E.g., H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING 
AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tent. ed. 1958); Jaffe, supra note 6. 
35. See, e.g., Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393 
(1981); Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549 
(1985). 
